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considerations
Abstract
The South China Sea ranks among the most geographically and geopolitically complex ocean spaces in
the world. It certainly appears to have been one of its most vigorously contested, featuring multiple,
longstanding and competing territorial and maritime jurisdictional claims. The objective of this chapter is
to provide the geographical and geopolitical background to the frequently conflicting national maritime
claims made by the South China Sea littoral States. This exercise is designed to provide the necessary
contextual backdrop to considerations of the application of maritime joint development mechanisms
and/or other provisional arrangements of a practical nature in the South China Sea.
With this in mind, key characteristics of the coastal geography of the South China Sea are outlined,
notably the implications of its semienclosed nature and the baselines that have been defined along its
coasts. The insular features of the South China Sea, many of which are subject to conflicting sovereignty
claims, are then examined with particular reference to their potential maritime claims and role in the
delimitation of maritime boundaries. The chapter then outlines the maritime jurisdictional claims of the
South China Sea coastal States, including existing maritime boundary agreements and maritime joint
development zones, as well as unilateral and historical maritime claims.
Accordingly, a spatial picture of the maritime geography of the South China Sea including the locations
and extents of claims to maritime jurisdiction is built up. The chapter then proceeds to highlight the main
geopolitical factors that arguably serve as key drivers for the South China Sea disputes. These include
longstanding yet still powerful sovereignty imperatives, significant and growing marine resource interests
and energy security concerns, crucial navigational and maritime trade considerations and evolving
military and strategic factors.
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CHAPTER 1:
WHAT’S AT STAKE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA?
GEOGRAPHICAL AND GEOPOLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Clive Schofield

I.

Introduction

The South China Sea ranks among the most geographically and geopolitically complex ocean
spaces in the world. It certainly appears to have been one of its most vigorously contested,
featuring multiple, longstanding and competing territorial and maritime jurisdictional claims.
The objective of this paper is to provide the geographical and geopolitical background to the
frequently conflicting national maritime claims made by the South China Sea littoral States.
This exercise is designed to provide the necessary contextual backdrop to considerations of
the application of maritime joint development mechanisms and/or other provisional
arrangements of a practical nature in the South China Sea.

With this in mind, key characteristics of the coastal geography of the South China Sea
are outlined, notably the implications of its semi-enclosed nature and the baselines that have
been defined along its coasts. The insular features of the South China Sea, many of which are
subject to conflicting sovereignty claims, are then examined with particular reference to their
potential maritime claims and role in the delimitation of maritime boundaries. The paper then
outlines the maritime jurisdictional claims of the South China Sea coastal States, including
existing maritime boundary agreements and maritime joint development zones, as well as
unilateral and historical maritime claims.
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Accordingly, a spatial picture of the maritime geography of the South China Sea
including the locations and extents of claims to maritime jurisdiction is built up. The paper
then proceeds to highlight the main geopolitical factors that arguably serve as key drivers for
the South China Sea disputes. These include longstanding yet still powerful sovereignty
imperatives, significant and growing marine resource interests and energy security concerns,
crucial navigational and maritime trade considerations and evolving military and strategic
factors.

II.

Geographical Considerations and Claims to Maritime Space

A.

Geographical context

The South China Sea is a large ocean space located between the southern coast of China and
Taiwan to the north, the mainland and peninsular coasts of Southeast Asia to the west and the
archipelagic island groups of the Philippines, Borneo and Indonesia to the east and south.
This semi-enclosed sea is bordered by the six claimants to the disputed South China Sea
islands (Brunei Darussalam (Brunei), the People’s Republic of China (China), Malaysia, the
Philippines, Taiwan, and Viet Nam) and two non-claimants (Indonesia and Singapore).
Additionally, Cambodia and Thailand are located along the South China Sea’s Gulf of
Thailand extension.
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The limits of the South China Sea have been defined as extending southwards from
the Strait of Taiwan to around the 3° South parallel of latitude.1 It has, however, been
suggested that the 1° North parallel of latitude may be a more appropriate southern limit.2 If
the latter definition is taken, the total surface area of the South China Sea (including the Gulf
of Thailand) has been calculated at approximately three million square kilometres (equivalent
to around 874,660 square nautical miles (nm)).3 The coastal geography of the South China
Sea is both characterized and complicated by the presence of a profusion of predominantly
small islands, islets, rocks and reefs. These coastal fronts are directly related to the maritime
claims of the claimants.

B.

Baseline Claims

National claims to maritime jurisdiction are fundamentally dependent on, first, possession of
land territory with a coast and, second, the geography of the coast concerned. Indeed, it has
been observed: ‘...the land dominates the sea and it dominates it by the intermediary of the
coastal front’.4 More precisely, a coastal State’s maritime claims are measured from baselines

1

According to the International Hydrographic Organization, the southernmost defining point of the South China

Sea is Lucipara Point on the east coast of Sumatra. See, International Hydrographic Organization, Limits of
Oceans and Seas, Special Publication No 23, 3rd ed. (Monte Carlo: IHO, 1953), at 30.
2

Hasjim Djalal, ‘South China Sea Island Disputes,’ in MH Nordquist and JN Moore, eds, Security Flashpoints:

Oil, Islands, Sea Access and Military Confrontation (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998), 109–133,
at 109.
3

Ibid. Technically the correct abbreviation for a nautical mile is ‘M’, while ‘nm’ denotes nanometres. However,

‘nm’ is widely used by many authorities (for example the UN Office of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea)
and appears to cause less confusion than ‘M’, which is often assumed to be an abbreviation for metres.
4

Prosper Weil, The Law of Maritime Delimitation - Reflections, (Cambridge: Grotius, 1989), at 50.
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defined along its coasts. In the absence of any other claim, ‘normal’ baselines will be used
coincident with the low-water line along the coast. However, relevant international law as
represented by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)5 provides
for several types of straight line baselines to be drawn as an alternative to normal baselines. It
is worth noting at this point that UNCLOS provides the fundamental legal framework
governing maritime jurisdictional claims, which has gained widespread acceptance by the
majority of the States in the world, including the South China Sea States (see below).6

Several of the South China Sea claimants have taken the view that their coastlines are
complex enough to justify the application of straight baselines along large parts of their
coastal fronts. Article 7 of UNCLOS allows coastal States to depart from normal, low-water
line, baselines along selected parts of their coastlines. The intention of Article 7 is,
essentially, to deal with particularly complex coastal geography where the configuration of
the coastline is such that using ‘highly irregular’7 normal baselines would result in similarly

5

United Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Publication No E97.V10, (United Nations,

New York, 1983). See 1833 UNTS 3, opened for signature 10 December 1982, Montego Bay, Jamaica (entered
into force 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS or the Convention], online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm>.
6

At the time of writing there were 164 parties to UNCLOS, comprising 163 States plus the European

Community. See United Nations, Status of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, of the
Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the Convention and of the Agreement for the
implementation of the Convention relating to the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and
highly migratory fish stocks, New York, updated on 29 November 2012, online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf >.
7

See International Hydrographic Organization (with the International Oceanographic Commission and the

International Association of Geodesy), A Manual on Technical Aspects of the United Nations Convention on the
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irregular maritime limits, such as a complex mosaic of enclaves or pockets of non-territorial
sea areas within a State’s territorial sea.8 In accordance with Article 7 of UNCLOS straight
baselines may be drawn ‘where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a
fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity.’ Rather than apply straight
baselines to selected parts of their coastlines, however, both China and Viet Nam have opted
to front the vast majority of their mainland coastlines with systems of straight baselines.

This liberal interpretation of the admittedly rather loosely phrased terms of Article 7
of UNCLOS runs counter to the view of the International Court of Justice, as expressed in its
decision in the Qatar/Bahrain Case, where it stated unequivocally that the method of straight
baselines in accordance with UNCLOS ‘must be applied restrictively.’9 It is highly
questionable whether the coastlines in question are sufficiently deeply indented, cut into, or
feature a suitable fringe of islands sufficiently close to the coast to justify their being fronted
by a system of straight baselines. Further, the Western terminus of the system in the Gulf of
Thailand is at ‘Point O’, out to sea and joining the Cambodian baseline system (see below).
Accordingly, these extensive claimed systems of straight baselines have been viewed as

Law of the Sea, 1982, Special Publication no 51, 4th ed, (Monaco: International Hydrographic Bureau, 2006),
Chapter 4, at 6.
8

United Nations, Baselines: An Examination of the Relevant Provisions of the United Nations Convention on

the Law of the Sea, (New York: Office for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, United Nations, 1989).
9

Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain, Merits, Judgment (2001) ICJ

Reports 40 [Qatar/Bahrain], at para 212, online: International Court of Justice <http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/87/7027.pdf>.
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excessive by other States and been subject to international protests, notably from the United
States.10

Viet Nam made a claim to straight baselines in 1977,11 with the claim being
implemented in 1982.12 Viet Nam’s claimed straight baselines start in the north and extend
for a distance of approximately 850 nm to enclose the entire Vietnamese coast south of the
Gulf of Tonkin.13 The islands used as basepoints for Viet Nam’s claimed straight baselines
are small, scattered and largely distant from the mainland coast, such that of the nine turning
points defined five are more than 50 nm offshore. Viet Nam’s straight baselines claims have,
consequently, been subject to critical appraisal by the US Department of State14 and have
been subject to US15 and Thai protests.16
10

See generally, J Ashley Roach and Robert Smith, United States Responses to Excessive Maritime Claims (The

Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1996).
11

The straight baselines were claimed through Viet Nam’s Statement on the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous

Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of 12 May 1977, online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/VNM_1977_Statement.pdf>.
12

Declaration on Baseline of Territorial Waters of 12 November 1982, online: United Nations

<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/VNM_1982_Statement.pdf>.
13

US Department of State, ‘Straight Baselines: Viet Nam’, Limits in the Sea, No 99, (Washington DC: Bureau

of Intelligence and Research, 12 December 1983), at 5.
14

Ibid. In particular the US analysis highlighted that the longest distance between basepoints is 161.8 nm, (the

average being 84.6 nm), that island basepoints averaged 39.4nm offshore with a maximum of 80.7 nm offshore
and that the internal waters claimed total approximately 27,000 nm2 (93,000 km2).
15

The US protest note stated that ‘there is no basis in international law for the system of straight baselines

provided in the declaration of November 12, 1982’, see Roach and Smith, supra note 10, at 102.
16

The Thai protest note, dated 9 December 1985, stated that between points 0 and A7, Viet Nam’s claimed

straight baselines were ‘at variance with the well-established rules of international law’, referring to both the
1958 and 1982 Conventions, and concluded that: ‘the Government of Thailand reserves all its rights under
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China enacted enabling legislation on baselines in 199217 and partially defined the
baselines in 1996.18 The 1996 claim defines straight baselines along the majority of its
mainland coast. A detailed analysis of this baseline system was undertaken by the US
Department of State. The analysis was highly critical of China’s baseline claim on the basis
that China’s coastline does not meet the criteria laid out in Article 7 of UNCLOS for the
application of straight baselines.19 It is worth noting with respect to China’s straight baselines
claims that this designation is only partial. While China defined straight baselines around the
Paracel Islands20 (a feature of the Chinese claim that has also been the subject to criticism),21
no straight baselines were defined around the disputed Spratly Islands, though such baselines
could be designated in the future.

international law in relation to the sea areas in question and the airspace above them’; see UN Law of the Sea
Bulletin 7 (April 1986), at 111.
17

See Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 25 February 1992, online: United Nations

<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1992_Law.pdf>.
18

See Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the baselines of the territorial sea,

15 May 1996, online United Nations:
>http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1996_Declaration.pdf >.
19

See US Department of State, ‘Straight Baseline Claim: China,’ Limits in the Seas, No 117 (Washington, DC:

Office of Ocean Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, US
Department of State, 9 July 1996), online: US Department of State
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/57692.pdf >.
20

Chen Degong, ‘China and the Law of the Sea’, Occasional Paper, Canberra, Northeast Asia Program,

Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, December 1996, at 23.
21

US Department of State, supra note 19, at 8.
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For its part Taiwan has defined its own system of straight baselines. This system of
straight baselines is extensive and applies not only to Taiwan’s main islands but also to Pratas
Island and the Macclesfield Bank. While at first glance Taiwan’s baselines claim gives the
appearance of archipelagic baselines, they are, in fact, straight baselines, taking into account
Taiwan’s claim to represent China as a whole. Taiwan’s claimed straight baselines, defined
all the way around Taiwan’s main islands are similarly excessive in character.22

Malaysia has not publicised the location of its claimed straight baselines. Their
existence can be inferred from an examination of official maps, notably the 1979 map (often
referred to as the ‘Malaysian Map’) issued by the Malaysian Directorate of National Mapping
on 21 December 1979 in order to illustrate Malaysia’s agreed maritime boundaries and the
limits of Malaysia’s unilateral territorial sea and continental shelf claims.23 Although no
baselines are shown on these maps, the fact that in certain areas the outer limit of the
Malaysian territorial sea claim is marked with straight lines leads to the conclusion that
Malaysia has necessarily constructed a system of straight baselines. Malaysia subsequently
enacted legislation in 2006 that provides for the declaration of the coordinates of the
22

A comprehensive and critical analysis of this claim is provided by the US Department of State; see: US

Department of State, ‘Taiwan’s Maritime Claims,’ Limits in the Seas, No. 127, (Washington DC: Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, 15 November 2005).
23

The Peta Menunjukkan Sempadan Perairan dan Pelantar Benua Malaysia or ‘Map Showing the Territorial

Waters and Continental Shelf Boundaries of Malaysia,’ often referred to as the Peta Baru [New Map], published
by the Malaysian Directorate of National Mapping in two sheets. The location of these baselines may then be
determined by drawing lines parallel to the outer limit of the Malaysian territorial sea claim but 12 nm landward
of the straight line limits of the Malaysian territorial sea claim. See Clive Schofield and May Tan-Mullins,
‘Claims, Conflicts and Cooperation in the Gulf of Thailand’ (2008) 22 Ocean YB 75, at 86-87; and Mark J
Valencia, ‘Validity of Malaysia’s baselines and territorial sea claim in the northern Malacca Strait’, (2003) 27
Marine Policy 367, at 367-373.
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basepoints for defining its baselines, though such coordinates have yet to be defined, or at
least published.24 Further, the joint submission of Malaysia and Viet Nam with respect to
extended continental shelf rights revealed the location of some of Malaysia’s straight
baselines, specifically those fronting the coast of the Malaysian provinces of Sarawak and
Sabah on the South China Sea, through illustrating them on maps included in the joint
submission.25

The straight baseline claims of Cambodia and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Thailand
in the Gulf of Thailand are also questionable. Cambodia’s present straight baselines, claimed
in 1982,26 join up with those of Viet Nam at a ‘floating’ point and join up small and disparate
islets. While Thailand’s 1970-vintage straight baselines in the Gulf of Thailand were

24

Vivian L Forbes, ‘The Territorial Sea Datum of Malaysia’, (2007) 14:4 MIMA Bulletin 3, at 7-8.

25

Joint Submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf pursuant to Article 76, paragraph

8 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 in respect of the southern part of the South
China Sea, Executive Summary, 6 May 2009, online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_mysvnm_33_2009.htm>.
26

Cambodia’s claim was made through a Council of State Decree dated 13 July 1982. In this legislation

Cambodia’s baselines were defined as being ‘straight baselines, linking the points of the coast and the furthest
points of Kampuchea’s [Cambodia’s] furthest islands’, online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/KHM_1982_Decree.pdf>.
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relatively conservative,27 its 1992 designation of additional area (Area 4) of straight baselines
was considerably less so,28 and has excited international protests.29

The South China Sea is also host to two archipelagic States: Indonesia and the
Philippines. Both have defined archipelagic baselines which are compliant with Article 47 of
UNCLOS. Indonesia claimed archipelagic baselines from 1960 and has revised and refined
its claims on several occasions since, notably through legislation in 1996 and regulations in
2002 and 2008.30 Indonesia subsequently deposited documents detailing the location of its
archipelagic baselines, including the coordinates of and a map illustrating the 195 turning
points involved, with the United Nations Secretary-General on 11 March 2009.31 These
archipelagic baselines encompass the outermost rocks and reefs of the Natuna Islands group
in the southwest of the South China Sea.

27

Areas 1 and 2 of Thailand’s straight baselines claim lie in the Gulf of Thailand. The other area (Area 3) is

located on Thailand’s western coast on the Andaman Sea. The announcement of the Prime Minister’s Office
concerning straight baselines and internal waters of Thailand was published in the Official Gazette, Special
Volume 87, Chapter 52, 12 June 1970, online: United Nations
<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/THA_1970_Announcement.pdf>.
28

United Nations, UN Law of the Sea Bulletin 25 (June 1994), at 82–84, online: United Nations

<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/THA_1992_Announcement.pdf>.
29

For example, the US Department of State analysis of this extension to Thailand’s claimed straight baselines

stated categorically that ‘clearly this is an excessive maritime claim.’ See US Department of State, Straight
Baseline Claim: Thailand, Limits in the Seas, No 122 (Washington, DC: Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs, 8 September 2000), at 9.
30

See Clive Schofield and Andi Arsana, ‘Closing the Loop: Indonesia’s Revised Archipelagic Baselines

System’, Commentary, (2009) 1 Aus J Mar & Ocean Aff 2, at 57-62.
31

For maritime zone notification and a complete list of the coordinates, see online: United Nations

<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/STATEFILES/IDN.htm>.
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For a considerable period the Philippines claim to baselines was at variance with the
terms of UNCLOS. The baselines claimed by the Philippines in 1961 and revised in 1968 not
only included a baselines segment (141 nm long) in excess of the maximum length permitted
under Article 47(2) of UNCLOS (125 nm), but were framed as straight baselines with
internal rather than archipelagic waters claimed within them. In 2009, however, the
Philippines revised its baselines and brought them into line with UNCLOS.32 The Philippines
now claims archipelagic baselines around its main archipelago and applies the ‘regime of
islands’ to outlying islands claimed, such as Scarborough Reef (or Shoal) and those Spratly
Islands claimed by the Philippines as part of its Kalyaan Island Group (KIG) claim. The
inclusion of the disputed South China Sea islands in the Philippines legislation and
reconfirmation of the Philippines sovereignty claims to these features led to protests from
China on the grounds that this represented a violation of Chinese sovereignty.33 Further, the
maritime claims of the Philippines remain problematic on account of its historically-inspired
claim to the Philippines Treaty Limits (see below).

C.

A ‘labyrinth of detached shoals’: The islands of the South China Sea

As noted, a key feature of the maritime geography of the South China Sea is the presence of
myriad predominantly small islands, islets, rocks, cays, shoals and drying reefs. The main
island groups of the South China Sea are as follows:

32

Republic Act No 9522, 10 March 2009.

33

‘China lodges stern protest over Philippine bill,’ Xinhua News Agency (18 February 2009), online:

<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-02/18/content_7489838.htm >.
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1. The Paracel Islands, located to the northeast which comprise around 130 islands,
predominantly divided between the Crescent and Amphritite groups which are
occupied by China but also claimed by Viet Nam.34

2. The Pratas Islands, located to the northeast of the South China Sea and comprising
three islands made up of coral atolls and reef flats which are occupied by Taiwan.35

3. Scarborough Reef, to the northeast, which has been described as ‘step-to on all sides
and consists of a narrow belt of coral’, which is predominantly submerged at high tide
but surmounted by a ‘tallest rock’ 3m high. This feature is disputed between China
and the Philippines.36 A feature often associated with Scarborough Reef, especially by
China, is Macclesfield Bank. This is an entirely submerged feature described as a
‘below-water atoll’ with a least depth of water over it of 9.1 m.37

4. The Natuna Islands, located in the southwest of the South China Sea are an extensive
group of islands under uncontested Indonesian sovereignty.38

34

See United Kingdom Hydrographic Office (UKHO), China Sea Pilot, Vol 1, 8th ed, Admiralty Sailing

Directions, (Taunton: UKHO, 2010), at 75-78.
35

Ibid, at 78.

36

See United Kingdom Hydrographic Office, China Sea Pilot, Vol 2, 9th ed, Admiralty Sailing Directions,

(Taunton: UKHO, 2010), at 74.
37

See UKHO, China Sea Pilot, Vol 1, supra note 34, at 68-69.

38

Comprising an extensive group of islands in the southwestern South China Sea. See UKHO, China Sea Pilot,

Vol 2, supra note 36, at 78-86.
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5. The Spratly Islands (see below).

With respect to the Spratly Islands, one notable early description of this complex and
numerous group of insular features dating from 1889 aptly refers to a ‘labyrinth of detached
shoals’.39 It can further be observed that traditionally the islands of the South China Sea have
generally been ignored. Predominantly consisting of very small, uninhabited islets of little
apparent intrinsic worth, they have long been regarded as little more than hazards to
navigation. For example, British Admiralty navigational charts routinely marked (and still
mark) the area occupied by the Spratly Islands, appropriately enough, as ‘Dangerous
Ground’.40 Arguably it is only since the expansion of national maritime claims offshore and
growing awareness of the valuable marine resources that may be contained within these
maritime spaces that disputes have surfaced.

It is generally well known the sovereignty disputes over islands in the South China
Sea relate to the Paracel Islands group in the northwest (disputed between China and Viet
Nam), the Scarborough Reef (or Shoal) in the northeast (between China and the Philippines),
and the Spratly Islands group (claimed in whole or in part by Brunei, China/Taiwan,
Malaysia, the Philippines and Viet Nam).41 What is often less well understood is the

39

AG Findlay, Indian Archipelago and China Directory, 3rd ed. (Richard Holmes Laurie: London, 1889), at vi,

quoted in David Hancox and JR Victor Prescott, Secret Hydrographic Surveys in the Spratly Islands, (The
Maritime Institute of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur: 1997), at 1.
40

Clive Schofield, ‘Dangerous Ground – A geopolitical overview of the South China Sea’ in S Bateman and R

Emmers, eds, The South China Sea: Towards a Cooperative Management Regime, (Routledge: London, 2009),
at 7-25.
41

The littoral States give one or both of these island groups names in their respective vernaculars: for the sake

of consistency and clarity English language toponyms will be used.
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geographical characteristics of these island groups. For example there exists great
uncertainty, on the part of media commentators and also in academic literature, as to the
answer to the deceptively simple-sounding question: ‘how many Spratly Islands are there?’
On the face of it this seems surprising, given the concerted focus on disputes involving these
islands, and on the South China Sea area, over a considerable period of time.

A key source of uncertainty relates to the lack of clarity over what type of insular
feature is under discussion. ‘Islands’ of the South China Sea range from relatively large
features, with their own water sources and vegetation which have been developed, for
example, to host military garrisons and runways, to much smaller islets, rocks, low-tide
elevations and reefs as well as entirely sub-surface features on which structures may have
been built. These features are scattered over a considerable area of ocean – estimated to be of
the order of 240,000 km2.42 An additional source of confusion in this context is the fact that
many of the features in question boast multiple names in a variety of languages.43 This
complexity of insular features, coupled with uncertainties as to what to count and even how
to refer to features, has led different commentators to arrive at radically different figures with
respect to, for example, the number of ‘islands’ that make up the Spratly Islands. At one end
of the spectrum it has been suggested that there are as many as 40044 or even 500 islands in

42

See Daniel J Dzurek, The Spratly Islands: Who’s On First?, (International Boundaries Research Unit:

Durham, 1996), at 1.
43

See Schofield, supra note 40, at 9-10.

44

See Craig Snyder, ‘The South China Sea Dispute: Prospects for Preventative Diplomacy’, USIP Special

Report, No 18, (United States Institute of Peace: Washington DC, August 1996), online: USIP
<www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/early/snyder/South_China_Sea1.html>.

29

the Spratly Islands group.45 Other commentators suggest figures in the range of 150-180. For
example, Dzurek has suggested that there are ‘more than 170 features with English names in
the Spratly Islands’.46

With respect to types of insular feature, UNCLOS provides for several options. In
brief these include islands and rocks, low-tide elevations, reefs and artificial islands. The
Regime of Islands is provided for in a single article of UNCLOS, this being Article 121
which covers both islands and a sub-category of island termed ‘rocks’. The provisions of
Article 121 have excited considerable debate over the years.47 Article 121(1) of UNCLOS is
relatively uncontroversial, defining an island as ‘a naturally formed area of land, surrounded
by water, which is above water at high tide’, as is the subsequent paragraph of the Article
which states that the maritime claims made from islands should be determined in the same
manner as for ‘other land territory’. However, UNCLOS Article 121(3) provides for a sub-

45

See for example, Glen Hearns and Peter Tyedmers, ‘Poseidon’s Trident: biological Diversity Preservation,

Resource Conservation and Conflict Avoidance in the South China Sea’, in Gerald H Blake, et al, eds, The
Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources, (Graham and Trotman: London, 1995), at 290.
46

See Dzurek, supra note 42, at 1.

47

See for example, Jonathan I Charney, ‘Rocks that cannot sustain human habitation’, (1999) 93 AJIL 4, at 863-

78; Alexander GO Elferink, ‘Clarifying Article 121 (3) of the Law of the Sea Convention: the limits set by the
nature of international legal processes’, (1998) 6 Boundary & Security Bulletin 2, at 58-68; Barbara
Kwaitkowska and Alfred HA Soons, ‘Entitlement to maritime areas of rocks which cannot sustain human
habitation or economic life of their own’, (1990) Netherlands YB of Int’l L XXI, at 139-81; JR Victor Prescott
and Clive H Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2005), at 61-75; Jon M Van Dyke and RA Brooks, ‘Uninhabited islands: their impact on the
ownership of the oceans’ resources’, (1983) Ocean Devel & Int’l L 12, at 265-84; and Jon M Van Dyke, J
Morgan and J Gurish, ‘The exclusive economic zone of the northwestern Hawaiian Islands: when do
uninhabited islands generate an EEZ?’, (1988) 25 San Diego L Rev 3, at 425-494.
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category of islands, ‘rocks’, that are incapable of supporting human habitation or an
economic life of their own. Such features ‘shall have no exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf’ – an enormous disadvantage in terms of capacity to generate claims to
maritime jurisdiction. Going to theoretical extremes, if an island had no maritime neighbours
within 400 nm, it could generate 125,6642 nm (431,014 km2) of territorial sea, exclusive
economic zone (EEZ) and continental shelf rights as compared to the capacity of a ‘rock’ to
generate a territorial sea claim of 4522 nm (1,550 km2).48

To date, however, no reliable way of distinguishing between these types of insular
feature has emerged, despite the fact that to do so is critical for determining their capacity to
generate claims to maritime jurisdiction. In short, despite exhaustive analysis, for instance of
the drafting history of Article 121 of UNCLOS, together with detailed analysis of past State
practice and the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, Article 121 remains a
conundrum and open to considerably varied interpretations.

Many of the features making up the disputed South China Sea islands, especially lowlying reef-type features, can be categorised as low-tide elevations, defined in Article 13 of
UNCLOS as a ‘naturally-formed area of land which is surrounded by water at low-tide but
submerged at high-tide.’ Such features are considered to be distinct from islands as a result of
their being in an inundated state at high tide. Consequently, low tide elevations are not
capable of generating claims to maritime space in their own right. Instead, they may be used
as territorial sea basepoints, but only if the low-tide elevation in question falls wholly or
partially within the breadth of the territorial sea measured from the normal baseline of a
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State’s mainland or island coasts.49 A low-tide elevation’s value for maritime jurisdictional
claims is, therefore, geographically restricted to coastal locations. Such features have been
termed ‘parasitic basepoints’ as their zone-generative capacity is reliant on their proximity to
a mainland or island baseline.50

As far as features such as banks and shoals that are never above low water are
concerned, such features have no capacity to generate claims to maritime jurisdiction under
UNCLOS. It should also be noted that despite submerged reef platforms having been used to
build artificial structures, UNCLOS Article 60(8) states unambiguously that: ‘Artificial
islands, installation and structures do not possess the status of islands. They have no
territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial
sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf’.51

Overall it would seem that the vast majority of features making up the disputed
‘islands’ of the South China Sea and the Spratly ‘Islands’ in particular are not islands capable
of generating extended claims to maritime jurisdiction in accordance with the first two
paragraphs of Article 121 of UNCLOS. Indeed, it has been suggested that only 48 features
among the Spratly Islands group are known to rise above high-tide and thus be subject to the
regime of islands.52 While some of these above high-tide features among the Spratlys are
49
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50
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relatively substantial features – the largest, Itu Aba being 1.4km long and 370m wide with an
area of approximately 50 hectares – and may conceivably be considered as ‘full’ islands from
which EEZ and continental shelf rights could be advanced, it would seem likely that many of
the other features that make up the disputed islands of the South China Sea, even if above
water at high-tide, could well be reasonably classified as mere ‘rocks’ within the meaning of
Article 121(3). It is also worth observing that none of the disputed islands boasts an
indigenous population or longstanding history of habitation, only what are essentially
garrisons of government personnel, and this can be regarded as a pertinent factor when
considering the question of whether a feature is capable of sustaining ‘human habitation’ in
accordance with UNCLOS Article 121(3). Accordingly, the vast majority of the disputed
features generally termed Spratly ‘Islands’ are no more than low-tide elevations, or even
submerged features with limited or no capacity to generate claims to maritime jurisdiction.

If features among the Spratly Islands are categorised as mere ‘rocks’ consistent with
the terms of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS, and thus deemed incapable of supporting human
habitation or an economic life of their own, their capacity to generate claims to maritime
jurisdiction would be severely restricted. The debate over whether features are ‘full’ islands
versus mere ‘rocks’ is, however, arguably something of a distraction. The disputed features,
even the largest among them, are clearly small and have short coastal fronts. The lengths of
the coastal fronts involved, and in particular the existence of a significant disparity in the
lengths of relevant coasts, has proved to be an influential factor in maritime boundary
delimitations in the past.53 Further, a review of the treatment of islands in the delimitation of
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maritime boundaries suggests that such features would consequently have a significantly
reduced influence on the course of any maritime boundary defined between, for example, the
disputed islands and the surrounding mainland or main island coasts. Such a conclusion has
been reinforced by recent rulings on the part of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) on the delimitation of maritime
boundaries where islands have been a key consideration. In both the Black Sea Case before
the ICJ of 2009 and Bay of Bengal Case before ITLOS which concluded in 2012, islands
were discounted as basepoints even before a provisional delimitation line based on
equidistance was constructed.54

This, in turn, suggests that the potential maritime claims to be made from the disputed
islands of the South China Sea, often illustrated by reference to maps giving these features
full-effect in the generation of strict equidistance lines, is misleading. For example, an
equidistance line constructed around the Spratly Islands and according them full-effect
encompasses an area of approximately 165,000nm2.55 However, debates over island status
and the capacity of insular features to generate claims to maritime space, let alone their
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potential role in the delimitation of maritime boundaries, tend to be obscured by the claims to
sovereignty over the territory of the islands themselves. Such sovereignty claims also
manifest themselves in a physical sense as illustrated by the fact that all of the claimants with
the exception of Brunei, have sought to back up their territorial and maritime claims by
occupying features among the disputed South China Sea islands. The resolution of these
island sovereignty disputes can be regarded as an essential precursor to the settlement of
overlapping maritime claims and the delimitation of maritime boundaries. Nonetheless, as
subsequent chapters in this volume demonstrate, even highly complex and contentious
disputes can be side-stepped through the application of maritime joint development
arrangements and, further, this can be achieved in a manner that does not undermine the
parties existing sovereignty and jurisdictional claims.

D.

Converging claims to maritime jurisdiction

As previously noted, UNCLOS provides the generally accepted international legal framework
governing maritime jurisdiction. Among the States bordering the South China Sea, Brunei,
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Viet Nam have all signed and
ratified the UNCLOS. Of the Gulf of Thailand States, Cambodia has signed the Convention
but has yet to ratify it. For its part Thailand signed the Convention in 1982 but only finally
acceded to it in May 2011.56 Additionally, non-UN member Taiwan is not a party to the
Convention.

A key achievement of UNCLOS was agreement on spatial limits for national claims
to maritime jurisdiction, which are largely defined as extending to a set distance from
56
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baselines along the coast.57 The South China Sea claimants have proved to be enthusiastic in
advancing such maritime claims. To a large degree these claims are broadly consistent with
the terms of UNCLOS; comprising claims to 12 nm-breadth territorial seas, contiguous zones
to 24 nm, EEZs to 200 nm and continental shelf rights. These claims, however, frequently
only represent a general claim to jurisdiction to a specified distance measured from claimed
baselines, rather than specifying the coordinates of a particular claim. There are, however,
exceptions to this rule, both in terms of specifying the limits of unilateral maritime claims and
with respect to their consistency with the terms of UNCLOS (see below).

The semi-enclosed nature of the South China Sea means that it is surrounded by
numerous bordering States and entities. This feature of the South China Sea means that the
maritime entitlements of the claimants tend to converge and overlap with one another. If
200nm claims from the mainland and main island coastlines are defined a substantial high
seas pocket exists in the central part of the South China Sea. This ‘doughnut hole’ that is
reduced in area but not eliminated once 200 nm limits are constructed from straight and
archipelagic baselines as compared with claims from normal, low-water line baselines along
the coast. However, this potential high seas pocket disappears entirely if extended claims to
maritime jurisdiction (that is, to EEZ and continental shelf rights) are made from the disputed
islands of the South China Sea. As noted many of the ‘islands’ of the South China Sea, for
instance among the Spratly Islands, could be classified as either ‘rocks’ within the meaning
of Article 121(3) of UNCLOS, or low-tide elevations, or even sub-surface features and as
such are incapable of generating claims to EEZ and continental shelf rights (and, indeed, any
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maritime claims in the case of features permanently below the low-water level). Indeed, there
are indications that some of the South China Sea littoral States regard all of the Spratly
Islands as no more than ‘rocks’, meaning that a high seas doughnut hole would exist in the
South China Sea (see below). Other Claimants appear take a different view. It can be
observed that even if only a few of the larger features among the disputed islands are capable
of generating extended maritime claims, this potential South China Sea high seas pocket
would disappear, or at the least be radically curtailed in area.58

E.

Existing agreements

Despite its well-earned reputation as an arena for disputes and conflict, agreements on
maritime boundary delimitation are not entirely absent from the South China Sea. Indeed,
though progress has tended to have been incremental and partial in character, several
boundary treaties have been concluded, including some in recent times. Examples include the
Thailand and Malaysia territorial sea delimitation of 197959 and partial continental shelf
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delimitation of the same date,60 the Thailand-Viet Nam EEZ agreement of 1997,61 China and
Viet Nam’s 2000 agreement on maritime boundary delimitation through the Gulf of
Tonkin/Beibu Gulf,62 the Indonesia-Viet Nam continental shelf boundary of 200363 and
Indonesia and Singapore’s territorial sea boundary agreements of 1973 and 2009.64 Brunei
60
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and Malaysia also appear to have clarified their maritime boundary issues through a 16
March 2009 Exchange of Letters.65

The South China Sea also features multiple provisional arrangements of a practical
nature in lieu or in addition to maritime boundary agreements. Such joint development
mechanisms have been established between Malaysia and Thailand concerning seabed energy
resources (agreed in principle in 1979,66 implemented from 1990), between Malaysia and
Viet Nam, also related to seabed hydrocarbons exploration and development in 1992,67 and
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between China and Viet Nam in 2000 concerning joint fishing activities as part of their
above-mentioned maritime boundary treaty.68 Cambodia and Thailand also agreed in
principle to pursue an accord on maritime joint development for part of their overlapping
claims area in 2001, although little progress has subsequently been achieved.69 These joint
arrangements will be considered in more detail elsewhere in this volume but reference to
them is included here as part of the overall jurisdictional scenario in the South China Sea. It is
notable, however, that both the maritime boundary agreements and joint arrangements that
have been concluded have been exclusively on a bilateral basis and largely towards the
periphery of the South China Sea.

F.

Historic claims

While it is the case that most, if not all, of the claims to sovereignty over disputed territory,
that is, islands, in the South China Sea owe something to history, there also exist claims to
maritime space that are, apparently at least, based on historical factors. In particular
Cambodia and Viet Nam have, since 1982, claimed an oblong area of ‘joint historic waters’
projecting from their coasts (but within their claimed straight baselines, in the Gulf of
Thailand)70 – a claim that has excited international protests.71 The Philippines has also long
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claimed rights within its ‘Treaty Limits’ – the ‘box’ formed by several nineteenth and early
twentieth century era treaties.72 In particular, the Philippines claims territorial sea rights
within the Treaty Limits box, and thus out to 285nm at its furthest extent from the Philippines
baselines.73 This claim and the Treaty Limits assertion generally, appear to be manifestly at
variance to the terms of UNCLOS.

The Philippines has also defined an irregular pentagonal box in the South China Sea,
terming the islands within this box, the ‘Kalayaan Island Group’ (KIG). However, the KIG
box does not appear to represent a claim to historic waters but instead provides an indication
of a claim to sovereignty to all the territories (that is, islands) within this area. This
interpretation is supported by the above-mentioned 2009 baselines revision leaves the South
China Sea islands claimed by the Philippines outside the Philippine’s archipelagic baselines,
instead dealing with them under the ‘regime of islands’, and in a manner consistent with
UNCLOS.

China’s (in)famous dashed line claim is of particular note here. This dashed line claim
(if it can be termed as such), remains shrouded in uncertainty. An 11-dashed line first
appeared on a map issued in 1947 by the Republic of China authorities but was subsequently
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adopted by the PRC in 1949, albeit with two dashes removed from the early 1950s.74 These
dashed lines are sometimes joined up by commentators to form a so-called ‘U-shaped line’
although it should be stressed that official Chinese sources consistently show a discontinuous
line. What is also consistent is a lack of clarity as to what this dashed line actually signifies. It
remains unclear whether the dashed line is a claim to sovereignty over the territory (that is,
the disputed islands) within it, whether it is indicative of a unilateral claim to a maritime
boundary or whether it represents a claim to the maritime spaces within the dashes, either as
historic waters or another type of maritime zone. The significance of China’s inclusion of the
nine-dashed line in its protest notes with respect to the extended continental shelf
submissions of Viet Nam alone and Malaysia and Viet Nam jointly, similarly remains
unclear. Nevertheless, several Chinese enforcement actions in the South China Sea in recent
times strongly suggest that the nine-dashed line remains the basis for Chinese claims. These
have included fisheries incidents in Indonesian claimed waters in the southwestern South
China Sea,75 as well as incidents related to oil exploration activities on the part of both the
Philippines and Viet Nam.76 Further, in mid-2012 the China National Offshore Oil
74
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Corporation (CNOOC) designated a series of oil exploration blocks in close proximity to the
Viet Namese coastline, yet just within the nine-dashed line which was also illustrated on the
map showing the CNOOC blocks.77 These activities appear to be only justifiable on the basis
of a claim to the limits of the nine-dashed line.

G.

Unilateral maritime claims

While, as noted above, many of the South China Sea claimants, in common with many
coastal States worldwide, simply make ambit claims to broad maritime jurisdictional zones,
several of the claimants have been more specific regarding the spatial limits of at least some
of their maritime claims. In the Gulf of Thailand, all of the littoral States defined unilateral
continental shelf claims in the 1970s, which substantially overlap with one another.78 In the
South China Sea ‘proper’, as previously mentioned, Malaysia issued a map in 1979 that
shows the limits of Malaysia’s unilateral territorial sea and continental shelf claims.79 In 1988
Brunei similarly defined a rectangular maritime claim extending into the South China Sea by
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publishing a series of maps.80 In 2010 Indonesia also employed cartographic means to clarify
its ‘forward position’ in terms of its maritime claims.81

H.

Extended continental shelf submissions

In 2009, in common with many coastal States around the world, Viet Nam alone82 and
Malaysia and Viet Nam jointly83 made submissions to the UN Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf (CLCS).84 These submissions are significant because they relate to
areas seaward of the 200nm limit from these States mainland coasts. The implication of these
submissions is that, as far as Malaysia and Viet Nam are concerned, the disputed islands of
the South China Sea are, at best, no more than ‘rocks’ within the meaning of UNCLOS
Article 121(3). This is fundamentally because, as noted above, if the disputed islands are in
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fact islands capable of generating EEZ rights, then no area of extended continental shelf
exists in the South China Sea.85

These submissions became a point of contention between the South China Sea
claimants with both of the above-mentioned submissions prompting near-identical protest
notes from China which stated in a diplomatic note directed to the Secretary General of the
United Nations dated the day after Malaysia and Viet Nam’s joint submission was made, that
China has ‘indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea’, and that,
consequently, Malaysia and Viet Nam’s joint submission ‘seriously infringed China’s
sovereignty’.86 These protest notes in turn led to counter assertions on the part of Malaysia
and Viet Nam stating that their submissions ‘constitute legitimate undertakings’ in the
implementation of its obligations as Parties to UNCLOS.87 Subsequently, communications
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have also been directed to the United Nations Secretary General by Indonesia88 and the
Philippines,89 both protesting China’s nine-dashed line, with the latter note leading to a robust
response on the part of China.90

It is worth noting here that the CLCS is a scientific and technical role rather than legal
one in the sense of adjudicating between competing submissions. Indeed, the CLCS lacks the
mandate to address areas subject to a sovereignty dispute or subject to overlapping maritime
claims. Furthermore, the Commission’s recommendations are also specifically without
prejudice to the delimitation of maritime boundaries with Article 76(10) of UNCLOS
providing that ‘[t]he provisions of this article are without prejudice to the question of
delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts.’91

The extended continental shelf submissions process, and the reactions to the
submissions made, is, however, of note in that these documents arguably assist in the
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interpretation of existing maritime claims in the South China Sea. While attention was
focussed on China’s inclusion of its nine-dashed line map with its protest notes, the language
used in the Chinese protests is potentially instructive. In particular, China’s note verbale in
response to the above-mentioned submissions of Malaysia and Viet Nam stated that China
has ‘sovereignty’ over waters ‘adjacent’ to the disputed South China Sea islands and
‘sovereign rights’ over ‘relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof’. This
language is, arguably, consistent with claims to territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf
rights made from the disputed islands, as opposed to a claim to historic waters or similar
within the nine-dashed line, as has been speculated.92 Further, in its response to the protest
made by the Philippines, China was explicit in stating that ‘China’s Nansha [Spratly] Islands
is fully entitled to Territorial Sea, EEZ, and Continental Shelf.’93 Unfortunately it is not
possible to be definitive on this point as China’s claim remains less than explicit. Moreover,
China’s recent enforcement actions and activities such as the issuing of oil concession blocks
in the South China Sea, as alluded to above, would seem to run counter to any suggestion that
Chinese maritime claims in the South China Sea are increasingly in keeping with UNCLOS.

III.

Geopolitical Considerations

A.
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Sovereignty remains a critical element of the South China Sea disputes. Such disputes
involve sovereignty over territory (that is, islands) and also sovereignty and sovereign rights
over maritime spaces. Although traditional Westphalian conceptions of bounded territorial
States have been subject to concerted criticism and challenge prompted, for instance, by
deepening globalization, the territorial State has by no means withered away. On the one
hand, globalisation has clearly led to increasingly unfettered flows of capital, ideas,
information and to a large extent labour, across and within the boundaries of States, thereby
arguably eroding the importance of international boundaries and undermining the
significance and authority of territorial States themselves. This, in turn has led to the
emergence of a developing literature challenging traditional assumptions concerning the role
and relevance of bordered State sovereignties. There are, however, powerful countervailing
forces favouring inertia in the international legal order and which serve to underpin territorial
States. Further, while globalisation may be changing or diluting the significance of
sovereignty and boundaries in some areas, in others they have been reinforced. For example
security and environmental concerns have been deployed as a rationale for the reassertion of
the role of territorial States and their international boundaries as barriers and filters against
hostile ‘other’ influences and threats.

For all the merits of the contemporary discourse and critique of territorial States, such
entities remain as the key actors and fundamental building blocks of the international legal
system. Indeed, it remains deeply unclear whether the international legal order, with the
concept of the territorial State at its heart, is indeed under terminal threat, not least for want
of a viable alternative system. Certainly sovereignty as a concept appears to be alive and
well, indeed enthusiastically embraced, in East and Southeast Asia, including its associated
maritime spaces. In this context it is important to note that the law of the sea gives States a
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primary role (unsurprisingly since UNCLOS was the creation of States). Crucially, claims to
maritime jurisdiction may only be made by States.94

Territorial States are, as the name suggests, dependent, at least in part, on the
possession of a ‘defined territory’.95 The fundamental linkage between States and their
constituent territories in international legal terms, coupled with the powerful influences of
nationalism, patriotism and the demands of domestic and international politics, means that
States tend to have great attachment to territory. Consequently, such entities tend to
vigorously defend any apparent threat to their constituent territories as a threat to part of a
State’s territory, however small, can be construed, especially to a domestic audience
politically, as an assault on the territorial integrity of a given State and thus a threat to its
legitimacy. This holds true no matter how small or apparently intrinsically worthless, for
instance tiny, remote and uninhabited islets, such fragments of territory may appear from a
detached, external perspective.
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Disputed sovereignty, especially over land territory (disputed islands) remains a root
cause, or at least explanation, for the South China Sea islands disputes, especially when
coupled with the influences of historical competition and animosity. Compromising on
sovereignty is especially challenging for territorial States, seemingly regardless of the remote,
uninhabited and apparently desolate nature of the territory (islands) in question. It can be
observed that this is especially the case where the legitimacy of the governments of the States
involved is closely tied to nationalism and patriotism which, in turn, provides a strong
imperative for the protection of perceived infringements of national sovereignty.

It is noticeable, however, that many sovereignty disputes over such far-flung islands,
including those of the South China Sea, have only manifested themselves in the post-World
War II period, as extended claims to maritime jurisdiction became more prevalent. This has
tended to add maritime jurisdictional and thus marine resource access issues as significantly
complicating factors in sovereignty disputes. However, although sovereignty disputes are
difficult to overcome, it is nonetheless possible to do so, for instance through the delimitation
of international boundaries or through innovative joint arrangements of a provisional and
practical nature that are, moreover, ‘sovereignty neutral’ and therefore do not imperil existing
sovereignty claims.

B.

South China Sea oil dreams …or illusions?

A long-standing assumption with respect to the broad areas of overlapping maritime claims in
the South China Sea is that they are host to substantial reserves of seabed energy resources.
Indeed, the words ‘potentially oil rich’ are often seen in close proximity to ‘South China Sea’
or ‘Spratly Islands’. Many such estimates are speculative, poorly supported and are thus
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frequently highly misleading. Nonetheless, persistent perceptions that the South China Sea
represents a major potential source of seabed energy resources and even a ‘second Persian
Gulf’96 is often suggested as a key driver in the South China Sea disputes. Recent incidents
involving oil and gas surveying and exploration activities tend to reinforce the view that
access to valuable oil and gas resources underlying contested waters is an important
contributing factor to the South China Sea disputes.

Certainly the potential presence of substantial and, critically, close-to-hand reserves
of, particularly, oil, would be extremely attractive to the South China Sea claimants in the
face of their generally increasing energy security concerns. States in Northeast Asia such as
South Korea and Japan have long been highly energy import dependent – Japan for instance
importing 90% of its oil requirements by sea. China became a net oil importer in 1993 and is
predicted to be importing 60% or more of its energy needs by 2020. In Southeast Asia,
domestic production is generally plateauing or declining. This means that currently or
recently exporting States such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Viet Nam already are, or are highly
likely to become, oil importers in the near future. This trend is compounded by predictions
that oil demand for these States is likely to continue to rise. Indeed, International Energy
Agency (IEA) figures suggest that growth in demand in Southeast Asia and China coupled
with maturing production there will mean that net oil imports are likely to quadruple by 2030.
In consequence imports would meet 74% of Southeast Asia’s oil demands, compared with
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25% in 2008.97 This, in turn, tends to underscore the importance of sea lanes security (see
below).

These present and increasing energy security considerations go a long way to
explaining not only the expansive maritime claims of the claimants, as well as the general
intransigence of these claimants with regard to their maritime claims – to compromise on
maritime claims may be perceived as running the risk of ‘missing out’ on a particular
claimant’s perceived rightful share of the potential (though potentially illusory) oil bonanza.
Suggestions that the Spratlys are host to enormous reserves of oil and gas should be viewed
with caution, however. While parts of the South China Sea are prospective and have long
attracted interest from the oil industry as well as the governments of coastal States, in light of
the longstanding disputes in these regions, the actual presence and size of the seabed energy
resources present within these contested areas have proved impossible to verify. Many
estimates as to the oil and gas resource potential of the South China Sea tend to be highly
speculative in character, precisely because of the lack of ground-truthing to information
derived from exploration activities.

South China Sea oil and gas resource estimates also tend to vary wildly. While this is
partially attributable to their essentially speculative nature, a key reason for the broad
disparities that exist between different estimates is a failure to distinguish between
undiscovered oil and gas resources and recoverable reserves. The industry ‘rule of thumb’ for
frontier provinces suggests that only 10% of estimated in situ resources can be recovered
(though this figure can vary and is in any case a function of oil price and extraction
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technologies).98 For example, characteristically optimistic Chinese estimates for the oil and
gas potential of the South China Sea tend to deal in resources rather than reserves. A further
source of uncertainty relates to geographical definition. Some estimates quoted for the South
China Sea in fact relate to Southeast Asia as a whole and thus includes resources located in
undisputed waters or outside the South China Sea entirely.

Moreover, many reports are less than rigorous in indentifying the type of resource
under discussion and in particular whether conventional or unconventional oil and gas
resources are subject to appraisal. Conventional crude oil is defined as oil that is less dense
than water which generally flows from the ground under pressure, and remains liquid at
surface temperature and pressure.99 Unconventional crude oil includes resources such as oil
shale, tar sands and deepwater oil resources. With regard to the latter type of oil resources,
significant technological advances are increasingly allowing exploration and development in
deep (that is, according to some definitions, water depths in excess of 1,000 feet) and
ultradeep (over 5,000 feet) waters.100 Such waters include parts of the South China Sea and
exploration efforts are underway there as illustrated by China’s recent domestic construction
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of semi-submersible, deepwater drilling rig capable of drilling in up to 3,000 meters of water
and the deployment of this rig in the northern South China Sea.101

In this context it is also worth noting that it has been suggested that the South China
Sea is predominantly a gas-prone province. This is good news in that recovery rates from gas
fields tend to be significantly higher than for oil fields (75% vs. 10%). That said, gas is a
substantially less attractive resource than is oil in large part because of high dependence on
oil as a key liquid fuel energy carrier, coupled with the significant limitations that exist in
relation to the use of gas as a substitute for petroleum-derived fuels. In particular, although it
is feasible to use gas in the transport sector, the global economy is to an extent ‘locked in’ to
technologies that demand oil-derived fuels.102 Further, estimates for South China Sea gas
reserves suffer from uncertainties of a similar magnitude as is the case for oil and for
analogous reasons (principally because of lack of exploration opportunities as a consequence
of overlapping maritime claims). A further important consideration is that many of the more
optimistic assessments of the gas resource potential of the South China Sea fail to distinguish
between conventional and unconventional gas resources. That is, many optimistic estimates
include gas hydrates. While gas hydrates offer considerable potential as a future energy
resource, at present their commercial development is well beyond the horizon. This is
essentially because they rank as the most technically challenging, and therefore expensive, of
unconventional gas resources. As a consequence of their position at the base of the hierarchy
of gas resources, gas hydrates are only likely to be developed after less technically
challenging and expensive gas resources are exploited. Given the enormous combined
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volume of other unconventional gas resources, development of gas hydrates is presently
beyond any foreseeable timescale. Consequently, the inclusion of gas hydrates in gas
resource estimates for the South China Sea significantly and unrealistically inflates such
estimates and renders them highly suspect from the point of view of near to medium term
energy security considerations.103

The potential oil and gas resources of the South China Sea should also be placed in a
regional and global context. The States of East and Southeast Asia face immediate and
increasingly pressing energy security worries, especially as demand is anticipated to continue
trending sharply upwards. However, even if the South China Sea disputes were to be resolved
tomorrow (a tall order indeed), and exploration activities could begin in earnest, South China
Sea energy resources, should they in fact exist, would provide no instant solution. This is
because it is usual for approximately 10 years to elapse between the discovery of a field and
‘first oil’ being delivered. Production from such a field would then need to build up over time
such that the South China Sea resources would be unlikely to peak for a decade and a half
following resolution (or shelving) of the territorial and maritime disputes in question. In any
case, it also appears unlikely that South China Sea reserves are likely to significantly address
existing and predicted energy demands, even taking into account the more optimistic resource
estimates mentioned above. This suggests that the oil and gas resources of the South China
Sea do not represent some kind of silver bullet for regional energy security concerns.

C.
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The South China Sea is host to a series of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) of regional
and global significance. These SLOCs connect constricting ‘chokepoints’ that provide entry
to and egress from the South China Sea. Of particular note in the southern part of the South
China Sea are the Straits of Malacca and Singapore at the southwestern entrance to the South
China Sea and the Karimata Strait providing access to the Java Sea and Indonesia’s
archipelagic waters and thus the Straits of Sunda. In the northern South China Sea the Taiwan
Strait between Taiwan and mainland China and the Bashi and Balintang Channels located
between Taiwan and the Philippines main island of Luzon are significant. The South China
Sea can also be accessed to the east via the Mindoro Strait and Cape Verde Passage
(connecting to the Sulu Sea within the archipelagic waters of the Philippines). Moreover the
South China Sea can be entered via the Straits of Lombok and Makassar and then the Balabac
Strait between the Philippines archipelago and Borneo.104 This route is particularly important
because it is a favoured route for very large crude carriers (VLCCs) when fully laden and is
also significant for LNG exports from Australia to China.

The SLOCs connecting these key chokepoints do not represent a single sea lane but
rather a network of routes used for navigation. The precise route used by a particular ship is
commonly influenced by its point of departure and intended destination, allied to weather
considerations influenced by the time of year the voyage take place.105 What is worth noting,
however, is that despite the fact that the disputed islands of the South China Sea are often
referred to as being located on or straddling these SLOCs, in fact the island groups in
question have long been regarded primarily as hazards to navigation – as shown by
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terminology such as ‘Dangerous Ground’ as mentioned above. Consequently, much maritime
traffic, for instance travelling between the Malacca and Singapore Straits and ports in East
and Northeast Asia, tends to sail well to the west of the disputed Spratly Islands. Similarly,
the Palawan Passage route skirts the east of the Spratlys archipelago.106

Secure SLOCs and freedom of navigation are essential to the smooth functioning of
the global economy as maritime transport continues to provide the ‘backbone’ of
international trade with in excess of 80% of global trade by volume being transported by
sea.107 If anything this dependence on sea borne trade is accentuated for the generally
resource-poor but export-oriented States of East and Southeast Asia and in this context the
SLOCs that traverse the South China Sea are unquestionably crucial. As noted above, there is
also a strong, and increasing, energy security dimension to sea lane security in the region. As
already mentioned, oil and gas import dependence appears set to rise sharply in the future and
the vast majority of these resources will be carried by sea. The IEA’s prediction, mentioned
above, of quadrupling net oil imports by 2030 implies substantially increased tanker traffic in
the future, thus emphasizing the significance of the SLOCs. A further consideration is that
these waterways are not solely used for commercial traffic. The South China Sea and its
SLOCs represents the shortest route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and is therefore
used as a transit route by, for example, naval vessels attached to the United States Pacific
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Command. SLOC security therefore remains a crucial and shared concern for all regional and
indeed extra-regional States and is only likely to become more vital in the future.

D.

The real prize? Sustainable marine living resources and the environment

The semi-enclosed, tropical environment of the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand hosts
marine environments of extraordinary richness in biodiversity terms. These environments
support fisheries of significance in global, and certainly regional, terms. Indeed, it has been
suggested that the South China Sea alone accounts for as much as one tenth of global fish
catches.108 Other sources have suggested that South China Sea fisheries provide catches of
the order of five million tonnes per annum.109 These marine living resources are fundamental
to the food security of coastal populations numbered in the hundreds of millions. Access to
the waters of the South China Sea and Gulf of Thailand in order to exploit these abundant
living resources therefore represents an enduring maritime concern of the littoral States. It
follows that the preservation and protection of the marine environment supporting living
resources that are so crucial from a food security perspective should be top policy priority for
the governments concerned. This is especially the case in reference to the vulnerable coral
reef ecosystems of the disputed South China Sea islands, which provide important nursery
and breeding grounds that are crucial to sustaining the fishery as a whole. In fact, however,
the marine environment, biological diversity and living resources in question are under
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serious threat.110 It remains decidedly unclear whether this factor is accorded the priority it
deserves in practice, at least partially because of rival claims to sovereignty and also arguably
misleading perceptions and priorities attached to hydrocarbons resource exploration and
development.

E.

The evolving military and strategic context

As is well known, all of the claimants to the Spratly Islands save for Brunei have backed up
their claims to sovereignty with island occupations. While the terms of the 2002 Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) tended to forestall further island
occupations, existing facilities have been maintained and in some cases substantially
improved. In this context reports in mid-2011 that Chinese vessels had been observed
‘unloading construction materials’ on a previously unoccupied feature, Amy Douglas reef
raised significant concerns.111 Should China or any other claimant go ahead and construct a
new facility and occupy a previously unoccupied feature, this would represent a clear breach
of the DoC which calls on parties to ‘exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that
would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability including, among others,
refraining from action of inhabiting on the presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays,
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and other features’.112 While the military worth of these garrisons, save perhaps as listening
posts, is questionable,113 fresh occupations of features could have a destabilising impact,
would be likely to have a negative influence on the fragile environment of the disputed
islands and should be set in the overall strategic context of the South China Sea.

An important allied consideration in the overall geopolitics, and geopolitical
competition, affecting the South China Sea disputes is the evolving military and strategic
balance in the South China Sea. It is abundantly clear that the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) of China is undergoing a rapid process of modernisation efforts, backed by the largest
defence budget in Asia – second only to the United States globally. While it is the case that
other South China Sea claimants are also actively pursuing force modernisation initiatives,
the pace and scope of the transformation of the PLA-Navy significantly outstrips their
combined efforts. This shift in the regional balance of power and, particularly, the growing
asymmetry in military terms between China on the one hand and the other South China Sea
claimants on the other, affect the strategic and geopolitical context of the South China Sea
disputes.114 Arguably, if this trend is maintained, as seems likely, China may have greater
scope to uphold what it perceives to be its legitimate territorial and maritime claims,
including through increasingly assertive and even coercive means. Indeed, it has been
suggested that the South China Sea disputes, and thus the need to effectively protect and
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reinforce sovereignty and jurisdictional claims, are themselves significant drivers for regional
naval modernisation efforts.115 Even if this proves not to be the case, the fact remains that all
of the South China Sea claimants are engaged in efforts to enhance their militaries, often with
territorial and maritime disputes invoked as the justification for arms purchases. These
developments, coupled with the failure of the parties to the DoC to implement the conflict
management and avoidance mechanisms envisaged within that document, mean that the
South China Sea is an increasingly armed environment. This, in turn, raises the stakes and the
risks of confrontational incidents. It should also be recalled that the waters of the South China
Sea are not solely the preserve or of interest to the littoral States and Taiwan. A number of
extra-regional States, notably the United States, but also India, Japan and Korea have
legitimate concerns in the South China Sea and the interest and presence of these States in the
South China Sea appears likely to grow in the future, potentially adding complexity to the
geopolitical and operational picture.116

IV.

Concluding Thoughts

The South China Sea is complex in terms of its coastal geography. The semi-enclosed nature
of the South China Sea, coupled with the multiple States bordering it mean that maritime
entitlements converge and overlap. Further, the eastern and southern margins of the South
China Sea are formed by islands and archipelagos and the South China Sea itself is host to a
profusion of insular features of one type or another, many of which are subject to competing
claims to sovereignty. These territorial disputes, coupled with uncertainties over what type of
insular feature is under discussion and therefore what capacity a particular Spratly ‘Island’
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may have to generate claims to maritime jurisdiction or influence a maritime boundary
delimitation line, considerably complicates the jurisdictional picture in the South China Sea.
Add excessive claims to baselines and expansive and historically-inspired unilateral maritime
claims and the level of complexity increases considerably, leading to substantial, though not
entirely certain, areas of overlapping maritime claims and, indeed, overlaps of overlaps where
the same maritime space is subject to the claims of multiple States. That said, it is worth
observing that some progress, especially peripherally, has been made. A number of maritime
boundary agreements and interim joint arrangements of a practical nature have been reached.
There may also be some hints of increased clarity in existing and heretofore worryingly
opaque jurisdictional claims. Overall though the geographical and maritime jurisdictional
picture in the South China Sea is one of continued and daunting complexity and uncertainty.

With respect to the geopolitical drivers of the South China Sea disputes, sovereignty
continues to have a corrosive influence that is extremely difficult to overcome. States are, by
their nature, territorial and there is ample evidence of this type of behaviour among the South
China Sea littoral States and Taiwan. The South China Sea territorial disputes over islands
cannot, however, be divorced from disputes over their associated maritime spaces and the
valuable marine resources within these areas. Here a reordering of priorities is surely
advisable. The waterways of the South China Sea certainly remain critical for all of the
parties involved, especially from the point of view of trade and energy flows and this is likely
to remain a shared concern. However, while there continues to be a strong perception that the
South China Sea is host to substantial seabed energy resources, it is suggested that even
should substantial oil and gas reserves exist, they are unlikely to solve escalating regional
energy security concerns. Arguably of more urgent importance is ensuring the protection of
the South China Sea’s marine environment with a view to ensuring the sustainability of South

62

China Sea’s fish stocks upon which millions depend for their primary protein needs. The
geopolitical outlook for the South China Sea, in particular based on recent confrontational
trends and set against a backdrop of increasing militarization of the area, is one that
emphasises competition over cooperation. This, however, only reemphasises the pressing
need for efforts to overcome the jurisdictional and geopolitical impasse. Maritime joint
development zones and provisional arrangements of a practical nature provide an important
and enticing potential opportunity in this regard.
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